with a national sales tax is that it would energize our economy by encouraging savings. The bottom line is that as a nation, we do not save enough. Savings are vital because they are the source of all investment and productivity gains—savings supply the capital for buying a new machine, developing a new product or service, or employing an extra worker.

The Japanese save at a rate nine times greater than Americans, and the Germans save five times as much as we do. Today, many believe that Americans inherently consume beyond their means and cannot save enough for the future. Few realize that before World War II, before the income tax system developed into its present form, Americans saved a larger portion of their earnings than the Japanese.

A national sales tax would reverse this trend by directly taxing consumption and leaving savings and investment untaxed. Economists agree that a broad-based consumption tax would increase our savings rate substantially. Economist Laurence Kotlikoff of Boston University estimates that our savings rate would more than triple in the first year. Economist Dale Jorgenson of Harvard University has concluded that the United States would have experienced one trillion dollars in additional economic growth if it had adopted a consumption tax like the national sales tax in 1986 instead of the current system.

As I have outlined here today, I believe the national sales tax is the best tax system to replace the income tax. If we enact a tax system that encourages investment and savings, billions of dollars of investment will flow into our country. This makes sense—America has the most stable political system, the best infrastructure, a highly educated workforce and the largest consumer market in the world. Our economic growth and prosperity would be unsurpassed. I am committed to bringing this message of hope to all Americans, and I look forward to working with my colleagues on advancing this important endeavor.

SENATE RESOLUTION 25—TO REFORM THE BUDGET PROCESS BY MAKING THE PROCESS FAIRER, MORE EFFICIENT, AND MORE CLEAN

Mr. MCCAIN (for himself and Mr. KYL) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration.

S. RES. 25

SECTION 1. REQUIREMENT OF AUTHORIZATION FOR PROGRAMS OVER $1,000,000.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Paragraph 1 of rule XVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by inserting ''in excess of $1,000,000,'' after ''new item of appropriation,''.

(b) 60 VOTE POINT OF ORDER.—Rule XVI of the Standing Rule of the Senate is amended by adding at the end the following:

''9. Paragraph 1 may be waived or suspended only by the affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Members, duly chosen and sworn. An affirmative vote of three-fifths of the Members, duly chosen and sworn, shall be required to sustain an appeal of the ruling of the Chair on a point of order raised under paragraph 1.''.

SEC. 2. PROCEEDING TO APPROPRIATIONS BILLS IN THE SENATE.

Rule XVI of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end the following:

''10. On any day after June 30 of a calendar year, a motion to proceed to the consideration of an appropriations measure shall be decided without debate.''.

ADDITIONAL STATEMENTS

OPENNESS ON THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL

● Mr. FEINGOLD. Mr. President, I rise today in strong support of opening Senate deliberations to the public during the course of the impeachment trial against President Clinton. I will therefore support the motion to be offered by Senators HARKIN and WELLSTONE to suspend the rules in order to open these proceedings to public scrutiny.

In this trial, the United States Senate is charged by the Constitution with deciding whether to remove from office a President twice elected by the American people. Although I am certain that every member of the Senate will undertake this Constitutional responsibility with the utmost gravity and perform ''impartial justice'' as our oath commands, I am concerned that the American people will be shut out of this process at some of its most crucial moments.

America's great experiment in democracy trusts the people to elect a President in a process that consists of months of public discussion, primaries, caucuses, debates, and finally an election open to everyone who chooses to participate. In stark contrast, the Senate's rules preclude the public from seeing its deliberations on whether an impeachment case will be dismissed, whether witnesses will be called or further evidence introduced, and even the ultimate debate regarding the guilt or innocence of the President. In short, Mr. President, the Constitution trusts the people to elect a President, but our current Senate impeachment rules do not trust them to have even the most passive involvement in our deliberative process, even when the debate might result in overturning the people's judgment in a national election.

Let me take a moment to describe again for my colleagues how our current impeachment rules work. The Senate is not only the trier of fact in this case, but it also acts as the ultimate arbiter of law. It can overturn the Chief Justice's rulings on evidentiary questions and make decisions, which cannot be appealed to any court, on motions. But the Senate's impeachment rules, which were first drafted in connection with the Andrew Johnson impeachment and most recently revisited in 1986, do not permit the Senate to debate any of the decisions that it must make, except in closed session. In fact, the rules provide that decisions on evidentiary rulings are to be made with no debate whatsoever.

Other motions can be debated, but only in private. So, for example, we expect that after the presentations are made on both sides, a motion will be made to dismiss the case against the President. Under our current rules, the House managers and the President's lawyers will argue that motion, but the Senate cannot debate it in open session. In fact, if a majority of the Senate wants to preclude debate entirely, it can do that by simply voting against a motion to take the Senate into private session for deliberations. Thus, before we vote on what could be a dispositive motion in this case, our only options are to discuss it behind closed doors or not discuss it at all.

I think this is wrong. We need a chance to debate this motion as Senators. I want to hear from my colleagues before I vote, not just afterward on television. I intend to carefully and respectfully entertain my colleagues' arguments, and I refuse to rule out the possibility that a well-reasoned argument offering a different perspective will influence my decision. But the American people also deserve to hear what we say to each other as we debate this motion. I see little to be gained from closing these deliberations and much to be lost. We must do everything we can to ensure public confidence in our fairness and impartiality. How can we expect the public to have faith in us if we close the doors at the very moment when we finally will speak on the dispositive questions of this historic trial?

Opponents of openness argue that in the only Presidential impeachment trial in our nation's history, that of Andrew Johnson, the Senate's deliberations were closed. While it may be tempting to rely on the precedent of the one previous Presidential impeachment trial, which occurred one-hundred and thirty years ago, I believe we should take a fresh look at this issue. In particular, we should consider how drastically the rules of the Senate and the composition of the Senate have changed.

The Senators who presided over President Johnson's impeachment were not elected by the American people directly, but were chosen by the various state legislatures, and thus were not directly responsive to the popular will. Today, we as Senators represent the citizens of our state directly and we are accountable to them at the ballot box. Furthermore, until 1929, the Senate debated nominations and treaties in closed sessions; and until 1975, many committee sessions took place in private. Today, all of our proceedings are open to the public, except in rare cases involving national security. The rules governing membership in the Senate as well as the openness of Senate proceedings have consistently evolved